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Summary findings
Boccara  and Nsengiytimva  evaluatc  whether, in the short  under the presence of middlemcn (renticrs in the export
run, a devaluation could bc contractionary in developing  sector whose presence  affects the devaluation's pass-
countries that export primary commodities.  To do so,  through to producers).
thcy use a model capturing the principal features of those  Their findings:
economies.  * For devaluation to succeed, there must be little wage
The two most important channels for transmitting the  indexing. Devaluation is more likely to bc expansionary
.;ange in parity are (1) a supply effect with the supply  in the middle-income  than in the low-income  country.
response for tradables essentially  a function of labor  * The devaluation's timing with the production cycle
costs relativc to the cxport commodity price, and (2) a  of the primary commodity cxport matters, cspecially  in
demand effect, with the supply response for the semi-  the middle-income  country.
tradables essentially  a function of the real wage.  * Debt rclief is more effective  where wage indexing is
They simulate the model for a middle-income  and a  low and can help offset the negative  effects of -wrong'
low-income  country. The cconomic structure of the low-  timing by increasing  output. But debt relief has an
income country is less  flexible (lower supply elasticity  in  asymmetric effect on exportable and semitradable
production, lower elasticity  of substitution between  sectors, as the production of semitradables  increases
domestic production and imported inputs) than in the  while that of exportables decreases.
middle-income  country.  * With a tariff reduction, the devaluation implies more
The model is meant not for use as a forecasting  tool  expansion in tradables. But this is not enough to
but to show the relative magnitude of various effects  that  compensate for the relative decrease in the growth rate
are relevant in countries where the initial supply  of production of nontradabies, so the growth of total
response to a devaluation  would  come mostly from  output  declines.
increased  production of an cxport commodity. In  a Unless  the timing is 'right,"  che  effects of
particular, Boccara  and Nsengiyumva  analyze the  redistribution (with income being "transferred" from
difference between the producer's response under  producers to middlemen  with a higher propensity to
.wrong'  timing (the predevaluation price is the price  consume imported goods) can have contractionary
signal on which production decisions  are based) and  effects that cannot be offset by debt relief.
This paper - a product of the Country Operations Division,  Wcstern  Africa Department  - is part of a larger effort in the
region to prepare for devaluation of the CFA franc. Copies  of the paper are available  free from the World Bank, 1818 H
Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Mather Pfeiffenberger, room J9-261, extension 34963 (26 pages).
February 1995.
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1  Introduction
While  it  is widely  accepted  that  in the  long  run,  a
depreciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate  will  improve  the
current  account  and stimulate  economic  activity, t'-are  is a
growing consensus  that devaluations  can have,  in the  short-
run,  contractionary  effects on output.  The nurpose  of this
paper  is to  evaluate  the  circumstances  under  which,  in the
short term, a devaluation in primary commodities exporter less
developed  countries could have contractionary  effects.
To do  so, a model  capturing  the principal  features  of
these economies has been used to evaluate the short-run impact
of  a devaluation.  The model itself is not meant to be used as
a  forecasting  tool  but  rather  to  illustrate  and  show  the
relative  magnitude  of various  effects which  are relevant  in
countries where  the initial supply response to a devaluation
would  mostly  come  from an increased  production  of an export
commodity.  In particular,  the paper analyzes the difference
between the producer's response under a "wrong' timing  (in the
sense  that the pre-devaluation  price  is the price  signal  on
which  production  decisions  are based) and under the presence
of middlemen  (rentiers in  the  export  sector  whose  presence
affects the devaluation's  passthrough  to producers).
The  model  is  simulated  for  two  economies,  that  of  a
"middle-income"  country  and that  of a  "low-income',  country.
The  economic  structure  of the  "low-income"  country  is less
flexible  (lower  supply  elasticity  in  production,  lower
elasticity  of  substitution  between  domestic  production  and
imported inputs) than that of the "middle-income" country.
Section  2  discusses  the  channels  identified  in  the
literature  through  which  a  devaluation  could  be
1/ The views expressed  in this  paper do  not  necessarlly  reflect the
views  of the  World  Bank and  its affiliates.  Any  errors  In this paper are
the  sole responsibility  of the  authors.2
contractionary. Section  3  develops  a simple  model  to  evaluate
the impact  of a devaluation  on aggregate output.  Section 4
analyzes  the results  of  model  simulations  and  discusses  policy
implications.  Section 5 concludes  the paper.
2  Channels  through  which  a Devaluation  can be Contractionary
2.1.  Introduction
To focus  on the effects  of a devaluation,  Edwards (1989)
uses  pooled  data from 12 developing  countries  to regress real
GDP on a country specific  time trend, a money  variable (with
lags),  the  terms  of trade (with  lags),  a fiscal  variable (with
lags), and the nominal exchange rate (with  lags).  Edwards'
findings  of significant  negative  coefficients  for  the nominal
exchange rate  variable  (without lag)  support the  growing
literature  -reviewed  below-  which  emphasizes  that  devaluations
can have,  in the short-run,  contractionary  effects  on output.
Krugman and Taylor (1978) showed that contrary to the
view  that  substitution effects  associated  with  a  real
depreciation  are  sufficiently  strong  to  assure  an  expansionary
effect  on  output  and employment,  there  were several  channels
through which a devaluation  could be contractionary.  They
show that income effects transferring real purchasing  power
toward economic actors with higher propensity to save can
create  excess  savings  and  reductions  in real output  under  the
following  circumstances:
i) With an existing trade deficit, price increases of
traded  goods  reduce  real  income  at home;
ii)  Even  if foreign  trade is in  balance,  a  devaluation
implies  profits  in  export  and  import-competing
industries.  If  there  is a decrease  in real  wages and if
the  marginal  propensity  to  save  is  higher  from  profits
than  from  wages,  there can be a contraction;  and
iii)  If  trade  taxes  are  an important  source  of  government
revenues, a devaluation,  by redistributing  income from
the  private  sector  to  the  government, can  reduce
aggregate  demand  if the  marginal  propensity  to save  from
the  government  is  higher  than  that of  the  private  sector.
On the other hand, Hanson (1983)  argues, using a more
general model  in  which  substitution in  consumption and
production is allowed, that it is not very likely that a
devaluation  will reduce  aggregate  demand.
Thus, the  absence of a  general relationship between
aggregate  output  and dev;aluation  comes from  the fact  that the
answer  depends  upon  whether  the  various  channels  through  which
a devaluation  can exert  a contractionary  effect  are relevant3
in a certain  country  and at a certain  time and we now turn  to
a discussion  of the relevance  to primary  commodity expoiter
LDC's  of the various channels of transmissions mentioned
above.  What follows is based on earlier work by Lizondo and
Montiel (1988).
2.2.  Effects  on A@aregate  Demand
Under  the  assumption  that  a  country  is a  price  taker,  the
total  demand  for  the  primary  commodity  export  produced  by  the
country  can  be  assumed  to  be  unaffected  by  the  devaluation
since in most  cases  the domestic  component  of that  demand  can
be assumed  to be negligible. On the other  hand,  the relative
demand  for  semitradable  and nontradable  goods  depends  on  their
relative  domestic  price,  and  on  the  elasticity  of substitution
in consumption. (See,  for  example,  the  models  by Devarajan  et
al. (1987,  1993).
A devaluation  also affects the demand for domestically-
produced goods since it produces changes in real income.
Lizondo and Montiel (1988)  show that the direction  of cha-.ige
in real income at the initial level of output depends on
whether traded  goods  have a higher  share  in consumption  or in
income.  The presence  of imported  inputs  make it more likely
that the real income  effect  will be negative  but this  may not
necessarily  be so if domestic  producers  substitute  labor for
imported inputs (assuming  that the real wage did go down).
The net effect  will depend  on the elasticity  of substitution
in production.
As has  been  mentioned,  a devaluation  can also generate  a
redistribution of  income  from  groups with  low  marginal
propensity  to save  to groups  with high  marginal  propensity  to
save, resulting  in decline in aggregate  demand.  However,  in
his survey  of 39 devaluation  episodes,  Edwards (1989)  finds
very  little  evidence  of  significant changes  in  income
distribution  in the period surrounding  the devaluations.
Another channel through which devaluation can  affect
aggregate demand  is though the stock  of net foreign assets.
The overall  effect  on demand  depends upon the composition  of
the stock  and debt financing  2/.
Finally,  the  net  effect  of a  devaluation  on investment  is
quite  complex  and, in theory,  indeterminate  since  the  various
2/  An  increase  in  the  domestic  currency  value  of  foreign  assets  would
be  expansionary  If  foreign  assets  are  repatriated  (reVerse  capital
flight).  rhe  effect  of  the  public  sector  external  debt  will  be
contractionary  (unless  the  devaluation  Is  accompanied  by  compensatory
debt  relief)  only  If  the  increased  debt  service  payments  are  financed  by
reduced  spending  (unless  It  concerns  imports  only)  or  Increased
taxatlon.4
channels which  influence investment behavior may work  in
opposite direction.  (See,  for example,  Chhibber  and Shafik,
1992.)  Furthermore,  as argued  in Dornbusch  (1990),  investors
are likely to adopt a wait and Bee  attitude and there is a
possibility that  an  economy  get  trapped in  an  inferior
equilibrium  where  the  transition  from  stabilization  to growth
does not materialize.
2.3.  Effects on Aagreqate  SuDDlV
In addition to the demand related effects identified
above,  there are  a  number of  supply-side channels  which
influence  the impact  of a devaluation  on aggregate  output.
The increase  in the price of intermediate  inputs  is the
most  important channel through which a devaluation can be
contractionary.  As a devaluation makes these inputs more
expensive,  in  domestic  currency,  the  marginal  cost  of
producing nontradable  increases.  (See,  Taylor, 1983.)
Labor  is an essential  cost of production  and the effects
of a devaluation  on  aggregate  supply  are largely  a function  of
what happens to real wages in each sector.
Finally,  the structuralist  school  (see,  for  example,  van
Wijnbergen, 1983)  has also emphasized  that a devaluation  can
be contractionary  if financing  costs for labor and imported
inputs (which  arise  because suppliers  often  need to borrow  to
pay for factor inputs -labor and intermediate goods- until
they get paid for their products) rise as a result of an
increase in nominal interest  rates.
We now turn  to a simple  model to illustrate,  in the case
of  a  typical primary commodities exporter less  developed
country, the effects identified above.  Although the model
developed below is fairly general in its applicability,  the
research  was motivated  by the January 1994  devaluation  of the
CFA  franc  and  the  economic  structure  underlying  the
construction  of  the  model  corresponds  to that  of a  typical  CFA
country.
3  Devaluation  and  Aggregate OutRut  Model
3.1  Structure  of the model
The  model developed  in this section  is similar  in spirit
to that of Devarajan  and  de Melo (1987),  and Edwards (1989).
Consider  a  small  open  economy  characterized  by  three
sectors:5
* a primary commodity  rsixport  sector (cash  crops such as
cotton,  coffee,  and  groundnut)  with  an  exogenous
international  dollar  price;
*  a  small manufactured goods sector where goods and
services domestically produced compete with  imported
goods; and
* a nontradable  goods sector.
In  what follows,  a  two-sector  model  iB  constructed  as the
manufactured  and the  nontradable  goods sectors  are aggregated
into a  semitradable good sector with  limited substitution
possibilities  with imported  goods.  The consumption  basket  of
residents includes semitradables (whose  production requires
imported  intermediate  inputs)  and imported  goods. There  is no
domestic consumntion  of the primary commodity export.  The
world prices of the primary commodity export and of  sem-
tradables  are assumed  fixed  since  we are  not  analyzing  changes
in terms  of trade.
To reflect  the short-run  nature  of  the  model,  the  capital
stock  is  assumed  to  be  sector  specific  and  fixed  and
investment  responses  are  ignored  3/.  The  model  also
abstracts from interest rate effects on the cost of working
capital since we assume  perfect capital mobility  which would
prevent the domestic nominal interest rate to be  greatly
affected  by a  devaluation. (We  ignore  agents'  expectations  of
future  devaluations.)
Thus, the model incorporates three important channels
through which  a  devaluation can  be contractionary:  (1)
intermediate  imported inputs; (2) presence of foreign debt;
and  (3) behavior of nominal wages.  The model is used to
discuss the  timing of a  devaluation with  respect to  the
production  cycle  of  the  primary  commodity  export.  An
extension of the model incorporating income redistribution
effects  is used  to discuss  the  presence  of  middlemen (rentiers
in the export sctor  whose presence affects  the devaluation's
passthrough  to producers.
3.2  Ecuuations  of the model
Let  X, Qr  and  M  designate  the  quantities  of exportables,
semitradables, and  imports  for  final consumption  (i.e.,
excluding  intermediate  inputs).
The model assumes the following  production  functions:
3/  In  practice,  investment  can  have  a  short-term  effect  (e.g.,
construction  boom)  but,  for  ease  of  exposition, this Is ignored  In  the
model.6
* two-stage  Constant  Elar;ticity  of Substitution  for the
production  of  semitradables with  an  elasticity  of
substitution a  - (1+p)-l  between value  added  V  and
imported intermediate  inputs  I  L/  ;  and
*  Cobb-Douglas  for  the  production  function  of  exportables
and value added in the semitradable  sector.
Thus,  we have:
IC  -[p-P +  (1-P)  viP  P  (1)
V -A0 La  (2)
,Y  -ax L.  "(3)
where  L  and  L  designate  labor  in  the  exportable  and
semitradable  sectors.
Let P* designate the international  price of exports, P'
the  international  price  of imports  and  of  intermediate  inputs,
and e  the  nominal  exchange  rate (in  domestic  currency  per  unit
of foreign  currency).  Let P.  designate  the domestic  price of
all imports,  P,  the price  of value added, and P  the price of
domestic  good.  Given  profit  maximization  and  perfect
competition,  we have:
Pv  V +  PM  I  PoQ  (4)
with
4/ An alternative  assumption  about  the  production  of  semi-tradable  Is
Q-Min  (1V,  2-I)
a  b
In which case (production  will be at a "corner  solutionw  unless  one of
the factor  has a zero opportunity  cost),  we have
V-aQ  ,  I-bQ
This is simpler  but does not leave  any  possibility  for substitution
between  domeostc  factors  and  Imported  Intermediate  Inputs.7
PMN eP;  (3  1  t )
where  t designates  the average ad-valorem  import tariff.
The first-order condition associated with the production
function of equation  (1) is 5/
I  _  k'  (  V)  ( 5C)
where  k' is a constant.
In the  presence  of  an  export  tax  B  ,  the  price  signal
received  by  the  producer  (i.e.  the  price  on  which  the
production  decision is based) is (1-s)e  P* and the government
receives  s  e P*,  X  in  tax  revenues  since  the  F.O.B.  price is
e  P.  y
We  now introduce  a variable  *  related to the timing  of
the devaluation  with  respect  to the production  cycle  of the
export  commodity.  Let  #  e.  at  galuation  designate the
effective  nominal  exchange  ra  e,,  Ve  one  that  matters  to
producers  for their production  decision.  If at the time the
devaluation occurs, all production decisions have already been
made  (e.g., devaluation  having been announced and taken place
after  planting  of  an  agricultural  commodity),  then  the
effective  nominal exchange rate is equal to e  t  d  (as
long as production decisions  are irreversibi.  n  £  case
the price signal that matters to the producers is the one that
prevailed  before the devaluation.  In the opposite case, that
of a perfect  and timely  pas3through,  we would  have  f  e_  _t
devaluationl  equal to ex  =Ront  dvaluationl-
5/'  Equation  (5)  can  be  derived  from
a-  P  k-P  Ql+P  I-(p+1)  aQ  (1-P)  k-P  Q'+P  P-2)
and
aQP-  ;  P0 a--P Po -a-V  v  0ax  N8
To be able  to analyze  all  intermediate  cases,  we consider
* a  continuous  variable  (O<#<1)  such  that  6/
with,
e  [-1  1,  O0].
If t x  - 1, the timing of the devaluation  is labelled
"wrong" in  the  sense that  it  occurs to  late  since  all
production  decisions  (based  on a  less  favorable  exchange  rate)
have  already  been taken.  Conversely,  if r  - 0, the timing  of
the devaluation is labelled "right" and the supply response
will  be  the  maximum attainable, given  the  technological
constraint  defined  by the production function.
Note that although the  behavior of the producers is
conditioned by the price which they perceived, the  price
actually paid is (1-s)e P*X  and not (1-s) $  e P*.  In other
words,  no "monies"  disappear  and  all  accounting  idntities are
respected.  Since the  F.O.B.  price in domestic currency
instantly  adjusts  to  the  new parity,  the  producers  receive  the
new F.O.B price (minus export taxes) but they do so on a
quantity which is determined  by the effective as opposed to
the actual  nominal  exchange rate.
Thus, to capture the influence  of the effective  nominal
exchange  rate on the  production  decision,  we write  the first-
order conditions  associated  with equations (2)  and (3)  as:
W-  PA 0 yLT-1 (6)
and
W - (  - s)  *e  PxA;x  OL1  (7)
Nominal  wages  are  adjusted  by a  proportion  a  of the  price
on semitradable  goods:
W- wPo  (8)
6/  As  usual,  a  - on  top  of  a  variable  Indicates  percentage  changes.9
where W is the waga level.  o  can be considered  a  proxy for
capacity  utilization  since  the degree  of wage indexation  can
be  assumed  to  be  an  increasing  function  of  capacity
utilization  since there  will be additional  pressure  on wag's
if the economy is experiencing  capacity  bottlenecks. On the
other hand, the presence  of unutilized  capacity is likely  to
limit the extent to which wage would be adjusted, reduce
inflationary  pressure and increar-.  the probability  that the
devaluation  would not be contrationary  V/.
On the demand side,  we assume that a  fixed  proportion  m
of  government  spending  G is spent  on imports. Let  C designate
private  demand  for semitradables. In equilibrium,  the market
for semitradables  clears  and we have:
I) Q  - C + G(1-m)
The  output of  semitradable goods C  is  an  imperfect
Bubstitute for iniports  M, in private consumption.  Assuming
that private sector preferences  are described  by a constant
elasticity of substitution utility function, the relative
demand of semitradables and  imports is a function of the
relative  consumption  prices and we have:
i  - K  I  (lPt)  e-  (10)
where  Q is  the  elasticity  of substitution  of semitradables  for
imports.
Equation  (10) can  be  derived  from  the  first-order
condition:
Uc  Po
UM  eP;  (3.+t)
with the C.E.S. utility  function:
7/ Alternative  assumptions  about the labor  market Include:  i)  full
employment;  Ii) fixed  real  wage when expressed  relative  to the  price of
imported  goods or the  price  of  semi-tradable  goods;  and  ii)  wage
indexation  with  respect  to  the general  price  level.10
U  - h[6C-C  +  (1-8)M- 8]  e
with Q =  (1+6)- 1 .
The private sector  income  is equal  to the sum of wages
and profits in both the semitradable  and exportable  sectors.
The associated budget  constraint  is:
(l-s)  ePX  + PvV  - POC  + eP(l  +t)M  (11)
Note  here  that  the  variable  *  is  absent  from  this
equation.  Again  this  is due  to the fact that,  in the end,
although  #  will have influenced  the producers'  response, the
price  actually paid to them  (even if they did not anticipate
it at the time the production  decision was made) will be the
ex-post price which takes fully into account the devaluation.
External balance is given by:
P;  X +  F  - PM (MXI+mG) +  1i'D  (12)
where F is exogenous foreign capital flows; DM  is the external
debt,  is  is  the  nominal  interest  rate  on  foreign  debt
payments;  and  u  is  a  parameter  of  debt  relief  comprised
between  0 and 1.
Given Walras' Law, the government's budget constraint is
verified  (it can be obtained  from equations  (4), (9), (11),
and  (12)) and is given by:
POG(l-m)  + eP;mG  + epiiD  - e(tP;(M+I)  +  sPxX)  +  eF
P*  is  chosen  as  the  numeraire  and  in  the  log-
differentiation  of  the  equations  of  the  model,  Is  is
systematically  set to zero.
3.3.  Approach to Evaluate  Impact of Devaluation
The objective  of the model  is to allow us to evaluate,
under various hypotheses,  the impact of a devaluation  on real
output  and  inflation  and  analyze  the  sensitivity  of  the
results to changes  in policy and exogenous parameters.11
The  model  has  twelve  equations  and twelve  unknown.  The
following  variables are endogenous:
X;  Q;  L ;  L2 ;  I;  V;  P  ;  Pv;  W;  C;  N; and G.
The exogenous  variables are:
PN±;  F; il and DX.
The policy and exogenous  parameters  are:
e and r  for the devaluation  and its timing;
p  for debt relief;
t and s for trade  policy; and
X  for the degree of wage accommodation (as  a proxy for
capacity  utilization).
Real output is given  by:
y  - I-(PoQ  +  eP,X)
Pr
with
Pr  - PQ (ePx)I
where P_ is the aggregate  output deflator  and v is the share
of  semitradables  in output  8/.
The strategy used to solve the model is to first log-
differentiate  equations  (1)  through (12)  having  replaced  P.  by
its expression  given  in the text.  Percentage  changes in the
endogenous variables can  be  expressed as  a  function  of
percentage  changes  in  the  exogenous  variables  and  Pv  which,  in
turn,  can be expressed  as a function  of percentage  changes  in
the exogenous variables.  The detailed  calculations and the
exact expressions for all the parameters are shown in the
Appendix.
8/  Note that the simulation  results on the  response  of output  to the
devaluation  under  varioua  assumptions  (timing,  debt  relief,  etc.)  were
not affected  by the  choice  of the  value of the  parameter v  in the  sense
that the relatlve  magnitude  and dlrections  of effe-ts  were always
similar.  Thus,  by simulating  the  model for several  values  of v, it was
verified  that  the  results  presented  in  the  section  that followv  are  not
osmply  capturing  effects  valid  only  for  specific  values  of v.12
The simulations  are used to analyze the sensitivity  of
the results  to wage indexation  (w),  timing  of devaluation  (1)
with respect  to the production  cycle  of the export  commodity,
and debt relief (p).  The model is also used to assess the
impact of a devaluation in conjunction  with a reduction in
tariffs.  Finally, a redistribution  effect is introduced in
anextension  of the model  to evaluate  another  channel through
which a devaluation  can have contractionary  effects.
4. Simulation  Results
This section is divided into six parts: the first part
discusses  the values of the parameters  used to calibrate  the
model.  The next three parts discuss the influence of wage
indexation  on the supply response in the case of a "right"
timing  and  compare  this  base  case  with simulations  results  for
a "wrong"  timing  with and  without  debt  relief. The fifth  part
introduces  tariff reductions  and the last part introduces  a
redistribution  effect.
4.1. Parameter  Values
To sLmulate  the impact  of a devaluation,  we need to set
values  for  the  2 elasticities  of substitution  a, and  2  and for
the following  13 shares:
A  =  share  of labor  in value-added  in the export  sector;
y  =  share of labor  in value-added  in the semitradable
sector;
m  =  share of government  spending  on imports;
=  share  of  imported  intermediate  inputs  in  the
production  of semitradables;
Ir  =  share  of government  consumption  of semitradables;
p 1 =  share of imported  intermediate  inputs  in output of
se,mitradables;
Yx  =  share of exports in foreign  exchange  receipts;
y  =  share of private final imports in total foreign
exchange expenditures;
YD =  share  of  debt  service  payments  in total  foreign
exchange  expenditures;
YI =  share  of total  intermediate  imports  in  total foreign
exchange expenditures;
0c  =  share  of  semitradables  in  private  sector
expenditures;
ex  =  share of revenue from export sector in private
sector  income;  and
v  =  share of nominal  value of  semitradables  in  nominal
value of total  output.
The values of the first two shares 0 and y implicitly
determine  the values of the (price)  supply  elasticity  in the
export  sector  (equal  to  0/1--)  and  of  the  (price)  supply13
elasticity  of  value  added  in  the semitradable  sector  (equal  to
yl-y  ) .
The thirteen shares  for the "middle-income"  country are
based  on  1991 values  for  Cote  d'Ivoire.  The  economic
structure of  the  "low-income" country  is  assumed to  be
relatively  more constrained  on the production side than the
"middle-income"  country in terms of imported inputs, local
production  capacities  (infrastructure)  and diversification  of
sectors  of production. It could,  for example,  corresponds  to
the economic  structure  of some  of the poorer  landlocked  Franc
zone Sahelian countries in Africa.  The three production-
related elasticities, i.e., the  supply elasticity in  the
export sector, the supply elasticity  of value-added in the
semitradable sector, and  the  elasticity  of  substitution
between  value added  and imported  intermediate  inputs (a)  are
assumed to be higher in the "middle-income"  country than in
the "low-income"  country.  The  values  used for the short-term
elasticity of export supply are respectively 0.11 for the
"middle-income"  country  and  0.053  for  the "low-income"  country
which corresponds  to labor  shares  of  value-added  in the  export
sector  0 respectively  equal to 0.1 and 0.05 9/.  The values
used for  the supply  elasticity  in the semitradable  sector  are
respectively  1.5  for  the "middle-income"  country  and 1  for  the
"low-income"  country which corresponds to labor shares of
value-added  in  the semitradable  sector  y  respectively  equal  to
0.6  and  0.5  10/.  The  value  of  the  elasticity  of
substitution  between  intermediate  imported  inputs  and  domestic
value added (a) is assumed to be 0.2 in the middle-income
country and 0.1 in the low-income  country.11/
On the demand side,  the substitution  elasticity  between
semitradables  and imported final goods (Q)  is assumed to be
equal  to  0.5  in  both  countries.12/  The  level  of  this
elasticity  depends  essentially  on  preferences,  and  the  pattern
of these preferences does not basically differ in the two
typical countries.
On the supply side, it is expected that the share of
imported inputs in the production of semitradables  in real
( 1I)  and in nominal  (p  )  terms, the share of revenue from the
export  sector  in private sector  revenue (O.),  and the share  of
exports  in  total  foreign  exchange  receipt7 (yx)  will  be higher
9/ The  choice  of  these  parameters  Is consitent  with the elastlicties
shown in Pritchett  (1992).
10/  rhe  estimated  value  for  the  labor share  of  value-added  (y)  is  0.57
in Branson (1986).
11/ Branson uses  0.2 for  Kenya.
12/ 0.5  Is  also  the  value  used  by Devarajan (1967).14
in the  "middle-income"  country  than in the  "low-income,,
country.  On the other hand, the share of semitradables  in
total  nominal  output  (v)  would  be lower  in  the "middle-income"
country than in the "low-income"  country.
Generally the share of semitradables  in private sector
expenditures ( 0c), the  share of private sector imports in
foreign  exchange  expenditures  (y  ),  and  the  share  of
government consumption of semitradables  (AG) are higher in the
"low-income"  country  than in the "middle-iMcome"  country.  On
the other  hand,  we expect  to have lower  values  for  m (share  of
government  spending  on imports)  and YD  (share  of debt service
payments  in  foreign  exchange  expenditutes)  in  the "low-income"
country.  Finally,  the  share  of total  intermediate  imports  (y)
in foreign  exchange  expenditures  (yI),  the  tariff  rate (t)  afd
the export  tax  rate (s)  are assumed-to  be the same  for the  two
typical countries.
The values chosen for a and Q and the estimated  values
f  or the thirteen  shares  as well as the  values  of the tax  rates
(parameter  t and s)  are given  in Table  1  for  both  the "middle-
income" and the "low-income"  countries.
Since the methodology  used to evaluate various effects
consists of log-linearizing  the model and working with the
reduced  linear  form  to study  non  marginal  changes,  the results
that  follow should not be  used for forecasting growth in
output following  a devaluation  since the absolute magnitude
are not meaningful (they are simply a function of how the
model  is  calibrated).  On  the  other hand,  the  relative
magnitude  allow us to understand  the strength  of the various
effects  being  analyzed  and  infer  appropriate  policy  responses.
The results are fairly  robust  in the sense  that they are not
very  sensitive  to  the  values  selected  for  both  elasticities  of
substitution.
4.2.  Short-term I. act  of  a  Devaluation  Base  Case):
Influence  of Wage Indexation
The results shown in this sub-section represents our
benchmark against  which we compare all the other simulation
results.  Figure 1 shows  the influence  of wage indexation  on
the  percentage change  in  total  output  following a  100%
devaluation.  The timing  is assumed  to be "right" (i.e.,  z  -
0).
Since the observed  supply response  is a function  of the
real  wage,  the expected  growth  in  output  is less  as  the degree
of wage indexat.on  increases.  In the extreme  case of having
the real  wage, expressed  in terms of the price of tradables,
unchanged (full  accomodation  which  cancels  the effects  of the
devaluation),  there is no change  in output. The same  is  true
for a full  employment  version of the  model.  Furthermore,  the15
more X  increases, the more  the relative  loss  in output  growth
(i.e,  the curves in Figure 1 are convex).  This relationship
is stronger  for the middle-income  country,  the corresponding
curve  being more convex.
Base  Case:  Xnluence  of  wae  indIexaemuutionasmn 
s0.s05 
Base Case:  Influence  of wage indexatian  assuming a
"right"  timing
Figure 1
The  policy  recommendation  from  these  results  is straight-
forward: the "middle-income"  country  would  suffer  relatively
more losses in terms of maximum potential output than the
"low-income"  country and, therefore,  has relatively  more to
gain  on  limiting  wage  indexation  than  the  "low-income"
country.
4.3.  Sensitivity of  the  Results to  the  Timini  of  the
Devaluation.
Figures 2-a and 2-b show  for both types  of countries  how
a "wrong"  timing affects  the outcome of the devaluation.  In
both cases, as expected, the curve for the "wrong" timing
(curve  labelled  B) is below  that for  the "right"  timing (curve
labelled  A which, for each type of country,  is identical to
the ones of Figure 1).  How  much below gives  an indication  of
the cost associated  with a poor timing of the devaluation.
The results show the following:
i) The comparative  loss in terms  of sacrificed  potential
output growth from a "wrong"  timing would be higher in the
"middle-income" than in  the "low-income" country, whatever the16
degree  of wage indexation  be. This result  is due to the fact
that  the supply  elasticity  and the share  of the  export  sector
in total output are assumed to be higher in the  "middle-
income"  than in the "low-income"  country.
ii) In  both  cases,  timing  matters  even  more,  in  the  sense
that  the  comparative  losses  are  greater  under  a "wrong"  timimg
if there is a lower  degree  of wage indexation.
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Figure  2.a  Figure  2.b
Note  also  that  with  a  "wrong"  timing,  there  are
possibilities  of  a  contractionary  devaluation  as  the  degree  of
wage indexation  increases.  This is especially  true for the
"middle-income"  country.  Thus, as has already  been seen,  a
low degree  of wage indexation  is crucial  to the supply  effect
of a devaluation.17
4.4.  Effects of a Devaluation  Accompanied  with Debt Relief
In this sub-section,  we investigate  whether the effects
of a "wrong"  timing can be "corrected"  by debt relief 13/.
Thus, Figures  3.a and 3.b  show,  for  both  type of countries,  an
additional curve (labelled  curve C) which corresponds  to a
scenario  of a devaluation  with the "wrong"  timing (r  =  -1)  and
a full debt relief (i.e.,  i--1 ).
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Offsetting  "wrong"  timing  with debt relief (curves  C)
Figure 3.a  Figure 3.b
The results show the following:
i) In both cases, debt relief helps by increasing  the
growth  rate  of  total  output  thereby  decreasing  the
contractionary  effects.  Note, however,  that debt relief has
13/ Assuming  that  a  given  devaluation  takes  place  simultaneously  In  a
"middle-incomen  and  in  a  nlow-incomer  country,  a  theoretical  policy
question  is  on  which  country's  production  cycle  should  the  timing  be
based  and (assuming  that  the  production  cycles  differ  drastically  across
the  two  countries)  the  extent  to  which  debt  relief  can  help  offset  the
-wrong-  timing.18
an asymmetric  effect on the exportable  and the semitradable
sectors:  It allows an  expansion of  semitradables while
decreasing the  supply responseX  of  the  exportables.  The
mechanism by which the export vector is hurt is similar to
that of an inflow  of foreign exchange  with the accompanying
well  known  phenomena  of  dutch  disease. Debt  relief  positively
affects government  revenues  and relaxes  the foreign exchange
constraint  thus allowing for an  increase  in aggregate  demand
which is inflationary.  In turn, the resulting increase in
nominal wage  reduces the  profitability of  the  exportable
sector and leads to a lower expansion of that sector.  The
increase in aggregate  demand results in an expansion of the
semitradable  sector.  The magnitude of this expansion  mainly
depends on the share  of interest  payments  in foreign  exchange
expenditure  (yD).
ii) Debt relief  is more powerful  whenever  the degree of
wage indexation  is lower: The relative  gain  in terms  of  being
able to undo the effects  of a "wrong"  timing  are greater for
a lower  degree  of wage indexation. Furthermore,  the relative
gain  is  more  important  for  the  "middle-income" country
although  the  effects  of  a "wrong"  timing  are  more likely  to be
completely  undone for the "low-income"  country (since  v, the
share of Bemitradables  in output, is likely  to be higher for
the "low-income"  country).
Finally,  we found  that  debt relief  results  in a  worsening
of the current  account  deficit (the  rate  of  growth  for  imports
increases  and the  rate  of growth for  exports  decreases  with a
debt relief),  reinforcing  the need for  additional  debt relief
or exogenous foreign capital inflows in the future.  This
worsening of the current  account is less  with a lower  degree
of wage accomodation.
4.5.  Devaluation  and Tariff Reduction
In this section,  we simulate a 100  percent devaluation
along  with a  50 percent  cut in  tariff  starting  from  an initial
average  tariff  of 30  percent.  (This  roughly  approximates  what
took  place in  some  of the  CFA countries  after  the January  1994
devaluation).  Timing and  debt relief issues are  ignored
(i.e.,  r  =  0; . =  1).  The results are shown in Figures 4.a.
and 4.b. for  both  countries. On each figure,  we show  both  the
curve for  the  base  case (curve  A as before)  and the curve  with
the tariff reduction (labelled  curve D)  14/.
14/  Essentially,  a 100  percent devaluation  accompanied  by a 50  percent
tariff  reduction  starting  from an average  tariff  of 30 percent can  be
thought  of as a 88 percent  nominal  devaluation  since
g  +  tt  lo(  100%-  _°'-3050%  - 88%
1+t  ~~1.3019
With the tariff reduction, the substitution  away from
traded goods  towards semitradable goods  is less  and  the
expansion in semitradables  is smaller.  On the other hand,
since  the inflation  is lower,  the real  wage is lower  in terms
of  the  export  price Px  and  there  is  some expansion  in
commodity  exports (not  e'hough  to compensate  for the relative
decrease  in the  growth  rate  of the  production  of semitradables
so that total output  is less  with the tariff  reduction).
LOW INCOME  COUNTRY  MIDDLE-INCOME  COUNTRY
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I S.E  l-1'1*-  ,,
10.0.A  15.0
0  ~~~~~~~~50-
0.6  0.1  w  6.5  0.1  V
Devaluation  and tarif reduction (curves  B)
Figure 4.a  Figure 4.b
The  results  above  also  show  that  if  the  nominal
devaluation  is judged  to be "too small", it is probably (in
spite of the inefficiencies  which would persist  in the
Thus,  the curve for the  devaluation  accompanied  by  a tariff  reduction
almost  looks  like  a  curve  for  a  88 percent  devaluation  and  Is  siLply
below  the  curve  for  a  100  percent  devaluation.  However,  solving  the
model  for  the  devaluation  cum  tariff  reductlon  Is not  equivalent  to
systematically  replacing  the  percentage  change  In  the  nominal  exchange
rate  by the  modified  percentage  change  shown  In the equatlon  above.
This is naturally  due to the  fact that an exchange  rate change  affects
both import  and export  prices  while a change in  tariff  only affects
import  prices.20
economy)  better  to  aim  for  a  greater  real  depreciation  by
postponing  the  tariff  reduction.  An  alternative  way  of
stating  this  is  that  a  large  devaluation  which  may  be
perceived  to be politically  unsustainable  could be replaced,
in the short term, by a smaller nominal devaluation without a
simultaneous reduction  in tariffs.
4.6.  Introducing  a Redistribution  Effect
Until  now,  on the demand  side, we only  considered  two
types of consumers:  the government  and the private sector.
In  order  to  analyse  the  potential  effects  of  a
redistribution  of  income  following  a  devaluation,  we  now
consider that there are two types of agents within the private
sector.  These  are  1) the middlemen,  who capture  rents  and
profits  in the production  of the exported  goods;  and 2) the
rest of the private sector.  As long as middlemen  and others
have  identical  consumption  pattern,  nothing  is  gained  by
dividing  the  private  sector  in  these  two  categories  since
contractionary  or expansionary effects are related to income
redistribution  issues whenever  the recipients  have different
propensity  to save  (and/or buy  imported versus  semitradable
goods).  Thus, in what follows, we assume that the consumption
pattern of the middlemen  differ  from that of the rest of the
private  sector.  It is assumed  that  middlemen  consume  only
imports  15/ whereas  the rest  of the private  sector  consume
as before  both semitradables  and imports.  Thus, we now have
three different types of consumers:  1) the government,  2) the
middlemen,  and 3) the rest of the private  sector.
In what  follows, M  and Mh designate  the quantities  of
imports consumed respectively by the middlemen and by the rest
of the private sector.
We assume  that  the relative  demand  of semitradable  and
imports  for  the  rest  of  the  private  sector  is  given  by
(equation (10) is unchanged but now only applies to the rest
of the private sector):
ck-[P;  (l+  t) e  0.
CM  K[  ]  (10')
15/ This extreme  assumption,  by introducing  a sharp  contrast  In the
consumption  patterns,  allows  us to  capture  fully the redistribution
effect. It  corresponds  to the  existence  of middlemen (who  would capture
the  difference  between  farmgate  and  export  price  of  an  agricultural
product)  sending  all  their  earnings  abroad.21
Profits in the production  of the primary commodity X are
given by:
nX  - (1-s)  ePxX  - WLZx
Middlemen  are assumed  to consume only imports  (taxed at
the rate t) and their budget constraint  is given by:
(l-s)  eP;X  - WL,  - eP;  O(l+t)Mc  (11')
The income  of the rest of the private  sector  now comes
from the remuneration  of labor in the export  sector and from
the  value  added  in  the  semitradable  good  sector.  The
corresponding  budget constraint  is given by:
WLX  +  PVV-  POC  +  ePZ(l+t)Mh  (11'')
Total  imports  now  include  imports  by  middlemen  and
imports  by  the  rest  of  the  private  sector.  The  ext-ernal
balance  is therefore  expressed  as follows:
Px  X + F - P; (Mc+Mh+I+mG) +  pi*D  (12')
Compared to the log-linear  form of the model used in the
simulation  described  in the previous  sections, we still have
the same linear expressions, except for the percentage changes
in C and in P . In addition,  the linear version of the model
with  redistrilution  includes  reduced-form  equations  for the
percentage changes in N  and  Nh.  The detailed calculations and
the exact expressions  for all?the parameters  are shown in the
Appendix.
Besides  the  thirteen  shares  specified  in  the  first
version of the model  (see Table 1), we need to know the values
of two other  shares to simulate this  second version:  1) the
share of imports by middlemen in foreign exchange expenditures
(yHC)  ;  and 2) the share  of wages  in export  sector  (n  ).  to
simplify the presentation, we just show simulation resiuts for
the  "middle-income"  country.  In  order  to  illustrate  the
redistribution  effect, we analyze two cases differentiated  by
the value of y,.:  1) imports by the middlemen  equal to half of
total  imports so that yRC  is equal to 0.25; and 2) imports by
the middlemen  equal to a-third of total imports so that y  is
equal to 0.166.  The value of n  is assumed to be identic  a  to
the  case  without  redistributibn  effects  (set equal  to  the
labor share  (y) in the export  sector of 0.6).22
We also have to re-estimate the values of two of the
thirteen  shares considered  in the first  version as they only
concern  now  the  rest  of  the  private  sector  (middlemen
excluded). These  two shares  are the  share  of semitradables  in
private sector  expenditures  (O  ) and the  share  of revenue from
the export sector  in total  priVate sector  revenue (O.).  Their
new  values  are  re-calculated  using  the  values  estimated  in the
first version and the assumed values for y  and  n  . The
values of the five specific sharer.  for the two cabes are
summarized  in Table 2.
Figures  5.a.  and  5.b.  show  for  the  "middle-income"
country the simulation  results with a redistribution  effect
for the two cases described above.  The comparison  with the
three  curves  shown  in Figure  3.b (again  curve  A  corresponds  to
the  "right"  timing,  curve  B  to  the  "wrong"  timing,  and  curve
C to  a  "wrong"  timing  with  debt  relief)  shows  the  consequences
of  introducing  a  redistribution  effect.
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With  the  redistributiorn effect,  the  fundamental
difference  comes from the fact that all additional  rents and
profits in the production  of the export  commodity  associated
with the devaluation are now only used for the purchase of
imports. Therefore,  the  total  demand  for  oemitradables  is now
lower. As a consequence,  the increase  in P  is smaller since
the production of semitradables  is now loer.  The implied
lower  real wage in the exportable  sector  allows  a relatively
greater  expansion  in that sector.  However,  the
relative  gain in production  of exportables  is not enough  to
offset  the relative lose  in production  of semitradables  and,
as  a  rule,  the supply  response  to the  devaluation  is dampened.
Under a "right" timing, this dampening effect is very
small (curve  A is only  slightly  below  the corresponding  curve
of Figures  3.b)  and  this  regardless  of the  proportion  of total
imports  consumed  by the  middlemen. In  this  case,  the  relative
expansion  in exportables  which is facilited  both  by the timing
and the lower real wage is basically enough to offset the
relative  decrease  in  the  production  of  semitradables.
Therefore, although there  are  marked  differences in  the
sectoral  composition  of  output  (with  the  greatest  expansion  in
exportables  and the smallest  expansion in semitradables  for
case 1), the three cases (no redistribution  effect, cases 1
and 2 of the redistribution  effect) are almost identical as
far as growth rate of total  output is concerned.
However, things are quite different if the timing is
"wrong".  In the first  case where middlemen  consume half of
total imports, the devaluation  has been found to always be
contractionary  whether  or  not an attempt  is  made to offset  the
"wrong"  timing  with debt relief.  Furthermore,  the extent  to
which the devaluation  is contractionary  is  not very sensitive
to the degree  of wage indexation  (see  curve  B in Figure  5.a).
For  the  second case, for which middlemen are  assumed to
consume a  third  of  all  imports, the  devaluation remains
contractionary  as well.  However, at least  for low degrees  of
wage indexation,  this can be corrected  by debt relief  in the
sense  that the devaluation  can be expansionary.
With a "wrong"  timing, all pass-through  effects of the
devaluation (price  increase in local curency of the export
commodity)  leak into additional  imports.  The only source of
demand  for  semitradables  is  the  additional  government
consumption  induced  by the  import  taxes  paid  by the  middlemen.
The  overall impact on the  semitradables is negative.  A
greater degree of wage indexation favors the production of
semitradables (though a demand effect) since it transfers
income from the middlemen  to the rest of the private sector
and hurts the production of exportables by raising factor
costs (supply  effect).
This section  has shown  that,  unless  the  timing  is "right"
in the sense  that  producers  receive  the ex-post  price signal,24
redistribution  effects (in  the sense  that price increase  of
the  primary  export  is passed  on to  middlemen  who have  a  higher
propensity  to  consume  imported  goods)  can  seriously  jeopardize
the success  of a  devaluation  by preventing  an expansion  in  the
semitradables  sector.  In most cases, the devaluation  was
found  to have  potential  contractionary  effects  which  could  not
even be offset  by debt relief.
5.  Conclusions
This paper has evaluated under what circumstances,  a
devaluation  could  be  contrationary  in  primary  commodities
exporter  less  developed  countries.  To  do  so,  a  model
capturing the  principal features of  these economies, in
particular those of the  CFA countries, has  been used to
evaluate the  impact of  the  devaluation.  The  two  most
important  channels  of transmission  of the  devaluation  are:  1)
a  supply effect  with the supply response  for the tradables
essentially  a function  of labor  costs  relative  to the export
commodity price; and  2)  a demand effect with the  supply
response  for the semitradables  essentially  a function  of the
real  wage. The  model  was estimated  for  both  a "midd3e-income"
and a "low-incomen country.
The simulation  results  confirm  that  a low  degree  of  wage
indexation  is  crucial  to  the success  of a  devaluation  (-his  is
the  base  case  against  which  all  other  si  .ations  are
conpared).  Timing has been shown to matter and to do so
comparatively  even  more in  the "middle-income"  country. Debt
relief,  which is a more powerful  whenever  the degree  of wage
indexation  is lower,  can help offset  the negative  effects  of
a  "wrong" timing by increasing the growth rate of total
output.  It has been shown,  however,  that  debt relief  has an
asymmetric effect on the  exportable and  the  semitradable
sectors.  Furthermore,  debt  relief  results  in a  worsening  of
the current account deficit which reinforces the need for
additional  debt  relief  or exogenous  foreign  capital  inflows  in
the future.
With a tariff  reduction,  the devaluation  is accompanied
a somewhat  greater  expansion  in tradables. However,  this is
not enough to compensate for the relative decrease in the
growth  rate  of the production  of semitradables  so that total
output  is less. Thus,  if  the  nominal  devaluation  is judged  to
be "too small", a possibility  is to aim for a greater real
depreciation  by postponing  the tariff  reduction.
Finally, as has been shown in the previous section,
unless the timing  is "right",  the presence  of redistribution
effects (with income being "transferred"  from producers to
middlemen  with  a higher  propensity  to  consume  imported  goods)
can  have  contractionary  effects  which  cannot  be  offset  by debt
relief.25
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a  0.20  0.10
Q  0.50  0.50
Shares
o  0.10  0.05
y  0.60  0.50
m  0.20  0.10
lx7  0.20  0.10
XG,  0.20  0.30
0.20  0.10
'V 1 0.75  0.60
YEt  0.50  0.60
YD  0.20  0.10
-;T  0.25  0.25
oc  0.85  0.90
01  0.25  0.20
v  0.40  0.50
Tax
rates:  16/
t  0.30  0.30
s  0.10  0.10
16/ The  levels  of  Impozt  and  export  tax  rates  only  matter  If  we
Introduce  change  In  tax  rates  In  the  simulatIon.27
Table  2:  Specific  Shares  for
the  model version  with
redistribution  effects
"Middle-income"  country
Case  1  Case  2
Y,,h  0.25  0.334
y,,=  0.25  0.166
Irr  0.6  0.6
0'c  0.92  0.89
0'  0.17  0.1728
APPENDIX
SOLUTION OF THE KODEL
A.1 Equations of the Model
The equations of the model are repeated here for
convenience. The equations of the first version  (without a
redistribution effect) are:
(1)  Q - k[pi-P  +  (1-p)VP]  P
(2)  V -A  LO
(3)  X  A-  LX
(4) Pv  V +  PM  I  PO Q
(5)  1T - k  (  pv)
(6) W-  Pv so  AYLOJ'
(7) W  - (1-s)  *e Pj  x  0XL0-1
(8)  W-w W%
(9)  Q - C +  G(1-m)29
(10)  C  PM (i+t)  e
M  ~~Po
(11)  (1-s)  ePxX  + PVV - poC  +  eP;  (  + t) M
(12)  PX X + F-  PN  (M+I+mG)  +  pi*D*
The first nine equations describing the second version
of the model  (version with a redistribution effect) are
identical to that of the first version. The specific
equations of the second version are as follows:
(101)  c  _,[P  (1+t)  e1
Mh  Po
(I 0//)  (1-  S)  eP;X  - N;L,  - eP;  (1 +t)  MC
(ii')  WLx + PVV - PQC  +  eP;  (1+  t) Mh
(12')  Px  X +  F-  PM (M+I+mG)  + pi*D30
A.2. Solution  of the  Model in Linear  Form
The strategy  to solve  the model is as follows:  First,
all equations  in each  version  are log-differentiated,  having
replaced  PR  by the expression  shown  after  equation (4)  in
the main t'xt.  Second, substitutions  of the linear  equations
are operated  to express  the percentage  changes  in the
endogenous  variables  as a function  of percentage  changes  in
the exogenous  variables  and in  P . Finally,  using (12)  in
the first  version  and (12')  in tie second  version,  we can
solve  for  the percentage  change  in P1  as a function  of the
percentage  changes  in exogenous  variables  only.
The linear  equations  for the twelve  endogenous
variables  of the first  version  are as follows:
(A  1)  y_ [J? - 19v3 Az  1I[  + 1t 6- 19v3
(A.2) f  - t(F  -
(A.  3) J? - q  [F  +s  _  _ 
(A. 4)  Pio - El.  Av + E2  (8+  t+ 
1+ t
(A. 5)  T  - R?[  - Piv  - °a[  +  +t  6  - AvX]
y(.  1+t
(A.6) Coy  1  0  v31
(A.7)  tX  - 0  1  +  1-S
(A.  8)  - ZE1  SV+  OB2  (L  +
I+  t  1+ 
(A )  I?1[  CIC  +  (  y1 (WE,_1)  + AIO)  1V
+ (  Y  COEZ  - AIx)  (d  +  t  tt  l 
(A.10)  R_  e  + DE 1P, + 0 (E2 - 1)  (LS+  +t
1+ t
(^A. 11)  §iy  - 1  [e2  ig  +  e3  1+t  C + e4 (Y  D  F  el  ~~1+t
+ 5 .5  s  + e 6 ]
(A. 12)  _1  [I1AV  + P2 (L +  - t t)  +  P3  (Y-P  TD)
+  4  LS  I  §  §-°
The first  nine linear  equations  are similar  in the
first  and in the second  version of the model.  The linear
equations  for  the four other  variables  of the second  version
are:
1+  t
(A.10")  l+-  e  6  wE1  +!  -(E2P  - +  1  (t  ( +t  fl 1 MN,  01i  01  1+t
+  _f0-7,  (  )  - 1) 
(1xW)(-1)  1_s  1_N  w  1  g32
(A.1  1)  16V  1  e  [  +  C3  t  t  +  C4  19 eil 3 0+e 3 136
+  -P  (r  Y F  YD  ii)  +  -_  S a  a  ~~~~1-s
(A.12')  6 - 1  [AI4  +  P2 (0  1+t  03  (YA  YDf')
+  P14 (  S  S* - 1P -6) +  15 6  + 16 
In both versions, the growth rate of total output is a
weighted  average of the growth rates in output of
semitradables and exportables:
f  - Ya  +  (l-v)'?
v being the share of nominal nalue of semitradables in
nominal value of total output.
A.3. Definitions  of the Shares and  coefficients
A.3.1 Estimated  shares  in the first  version
AI  I  P  +;  xA  V  - 11
'  1i-P  +  (1-3)  V-P
AGI  (1-m)G  IAc  - 1  AG
PM I
PM/I  +  PrV  1 33
Tx-  xx  Y  F-lYx PX*X 
Ym - PM*M
PmPM  (M+  I+mG) + pi  D
PM!(M+I+rG)  + Fi*D
TI-  '4pm  I  YG  'TfrYITyD
PC*
rI-  ~  g  ;  er  - 1--Dc  _
P,;  (M+  X+MG)  + pi'DGM  D
oc  - '  Q  - on  - 1  oC
PQe  C  +  eP,*(l+t)M
ox  - (1-s)ePxX  eV  D  I  - OX
(1-s)eP,*X  + PvV
PQ Q
PQ Q + ePxX
A.3.2  Estimated  shares  in  the  second  version
All the shares  in the second  version  are the same  as in
the first version, except the following seven  shares:34
YNh  pPD  M  Yi  nYHNYHh
P.(Mh+MC+I+mG)  + pi"D
o'-PQ  C
P  C  + eP  (1+t)Mbh
OX~PVV+  WLX  @V  I  3




A.3.3 calculated coefficients in the first version
E2.-  R  - UZvP  (-l)a
£2  - Pj(1-o)  + Xra
a  -Y  rA  Ž1C XG
1  {3-  YXWE3.  Y 1  GA+YX)  (WH1 -1)  - YRQE1  - YXCO - A  l6r
FZ ( {-1  YX  YXY1  AG Y1)  2iE  Yf  -1)  + YI  a  +  A  1G35
P33-l  ;  P4 - Y
61 - (eX  x 0 1o - o)-PI  - a  JmEk  + 0V [1  +  1(-  C  1 -l)]
'  OcE 2 +  (P2  - P4 )  +  Oe  [1  +  a  (E2-1)]
+*  1  (1  -80  H)  +  eV  1-y  2
e3  - O0E2 +P2  +  B1OM[1+QF(E 2 -1)1  +  e (a  -E2 +  0  X lz  X  -~~~1-0  1-Y
e4  - 3  e5  - 0  +  6  - eX  e  3  4
A.3.3 calculated  coefficients  in the second  version
In the second  version,  the following  coefficients  are
the same  as in the first  version:
1 Ei 2 , and  p3
We also have  the same  expressions  in both versions  for
e1L  63e  and e, except  that 0  , 6  , 0  ,  and 0  in the first
v'erson are replaced  by  c,  0 Ml O ,  and 0 v  in the second
version,  respectively.
The specific  coefficients  for the second  version are  the
following:36
AG
at  - r  ~7~  A<;
0-  Y-1  +  (3E  -1 )
- TwzQEi  YrIa  AAI  - 0  MCE
p-  X 8 y  YI  -C  A  z  yL)  (0E 2
'-iG
-2  y  (  Q(E 2 -1  +  ai  (p  - V4+5  M[  E-
y  YAG  rn...
e-o  X-i-  YM  y
65-  Yx  +  a  ay
- 1 P 5 - Yx  I  P
+m  06  - +I  '4[  E-) 05-  "C2 
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